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The Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a
National Nor a Federal Constitution,
But a Composition of Both"
Martin Diamondt
Something surprising confronts the contemporary reader who turns
to The Federalist to see what it has to say about federalism. Expecting
to find the original source of his view of American federalism, he
finds instead a very different understanding from ours of the nature
of federalism and of the federal character of American government.
We think that the invention of federal government was the most im-
portant contribution made by the American founders to the art of
government and we thus regard the system they devised as the very
paradigm of what we call "federal government." Indeed, as we shall
see, most contemporary definitions of federalism are little more than
generalized descriptions of the way we Americans divide governing
power between the states and the central government. It is surprising,
therefore, to discover that The Federalist does not likewise characterize
the American constitutional system as a "federal government." In-
stead, it tells us that the "proposed Constitution . . . is in strictness
neither a national nor a federal constitution; but a composition of
both."'
This formulation is typical of the way the entire founding genera-
tion saw the matter. For example, the proceedings of the Federal
Convention-especially in the famous compromise regarding the House
and Senate-show that the delegates likewise understood the terms
federal and national in a way that required characterizing the Con-
t Leavey Professor of the Foundations of American Freedom, Georgetown University.
The Editors regret the passing of Professor Diamond not long after this essay was
completed. All students of the Constitution are greatly indebted to him for what he
taught us about the thought and aspirations that inspired our existing form of govern-
ment.
1. THE FaumXLIs-r No. 39, at 257 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited to this edition
without reference to editor]. Professor Cooke's edition is the definitive modern edition
of The Federalist.
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stitution as a compound or composition of both elements. But what
Madison and the founding generation carefully distinguished as partly
federal and partly national, we have for a long time blended or blurred
under the single term federal. Alexis de Tocqueville saw this happen-
ing: "Clearly here we have not a federal government but an incom-
plete national government. Hence a form of government has been
found which is neither precisely national nor federal; but things have
halted there, and the new word to express this new thing does not yet
exist."'2 Although it may well have been politically salutary that things
"halted" at the old word federal, much may thereby have been lost in
precision. And that is the concern of this review of what The Federalist
teaches about federalism, namely, to suggest that it would be ana-
lytically useful to restore The Federalist's "strict" distinction between
the federal and the national elements in our compound political sys-
tem, and therewith to restore also The Federalist's understanding of
federalism in general.
The Federalist was operating with a typology, so to speak, composed
of two fundamental modes of political organization, the federal and
the national. The founders thought that they had combined these two
fundamental modes or "elements" into a "compound" system. We
disagree and think, instead, that they invented a third fundamental
mode or element, which we call federal government. In so thinking,
we are operating with a typology composed of three elemental forms:
confederation, federal government, and national or unitary govern-
ment. The difference between our thinking and that of the founders
evidently turns on the distinction that we make, and they did not,
between confederalism and federalism. That familiar distinction will
be found in almost all contemporary writing on federalism. But The
Federalist and the whole founding generation saw no more difference
between confederalism and federalism than we see, say, between the
words inflammable and flammable; nothing more was involved than
the accidental presence or absence of a nonsignifying prefix. For
the founders, then, there were only two basic modes to choose from:
confederal/federal as opposed to national/unitary; confederal/federal
being that mode which preserves the primacy and autonomy of the
states, and the national/unitary being that mode which gives un-
impeded primacy to the government of the whole society. Given
their bipartite typology or framework, the founders had to view the
Constitution as being a "composition" of the two elemental modes
2. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 143 (J. Mayer SL M. Lerner eds. 1966).
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and, given our tripartite one, we have to see the Constitution as
elementally fedetal. The question is who is right, we or they? Which
is the more useful mode of analysis?
It is instructive, and perhaps disconcerting, to learn that our modern
distinction between confederalism and federalism derives from John
Calhoun. His Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the
United States begins with a severe and systematic attack on The
Federalist's view of federalism. In particular, Calhoun argues that its
view of American government as compoundly federal and national is
a "deep and radical error."3 Now Calhoun had some very practical
reasons for rejecting the "compound" view. He could not admit that
there was anything national at all about the central government be-
cause that would open the door to an effective national jurisdiction
over South Carolina's slave interests. Yet, because the central govern-
ment under the Constitution was so palpably stronger than under the
Articles of Confederation, Calhoun could not characterize it as con-
federal/federal, which was the only category left to him according to
the bipartite typology then still universally accepted. Moreover, Cal-
houn did not really want to return to the old Articles; he was not
averse to having a government as powerful as that under the Constitu-
tion, provided it could be rendered safe for southern interests. Cal-
houn solved all of his problems by inventing a new category of "federal
government" which he contradistinguished from both a confederacy
and a national government.
Not surprisingly, Calhoun saw "federal government" as differing
rather more from the national form, which posed the threat to south-
ern interests, than from the confederal form. Indeed, Calhoun's new
"federal government" turns out to be nothing but a confederacy in
all respects save one; unlike a confederacy, which has at its center
"a mere congress of delegates," it has a real central government to
carry its powers into execution. This becomes clear if we examine
his famous and shrewdly labeled theory of the "concurrent majority."
The concurrent majority is in fact a system of unanimous concurrence;
according to Calhoun's scheme, the central government can act only
when its measures have the unanimous concurrence of majorities in
every sovereign sub-unit of the system. This requirement of unanim-
ity (an exaggeratedly confederal requirement) guaranteed that noth-
ing could be done without the voluntary concurrence of South Caro-
3. J. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION
AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 156 (R. Cralle ed. 1851).
4. Id. at 163.
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lina. Whatever South Carolina concurred in, however, would then be
executed, not with confederal weakness, but directly upon individuals
throughout the country with the full force of a national government.
Is it not clear, then, that far from being contradistinguished from
confederation and national government, Calhoun's "federal govern-
ment" is in fact nothing but a compound of these two fundamental
forms? He combined an exaggeratedly confederal/federal means of ar-
riving at central decisions with a wholly national means of execution,
and then arbitrarily assigned to his peculiar compound the new label
of federal government.
This appears to have been an important source of our contemporary
understanding of federalism. While we have largely rejected his theory
of the concurrent majority, we have nonetheless taken over Calhoun's
tripartite framework and the elemental status it assigns to federal gov-
ernment. Many scholars have, of course, been perfectly aware that the
founding generation conceived their handiwork differently than Cal-
houn did and we do. But the difference has not been taken seriously.
Either there has been a patronizing assumption that our understanding
has scientifically superseded theirs, or the difference has been shrugged
off as a mere matter of their having their terminology and we ours.5
But this is surely too serious a matter to be so quickly dismissed; if
The Federalist is analytically right in its compound view, then we
have lost ground in our understanding of federalism. After all, is it
not as obscurantist in political things, as it would be in, say, physics
or chemistry, to confuse as a new element what in fact is only a com-
pound? In both cases, it would be rendered difficult if not impossible
to see how the essential parts of the compound worked and, thereby,
to know how to achieve, preserve, or improve it.
To resolve our dispute with The Federalist, as to whether our po-
litical system is compoundly federal and national or integrally fed-
eral, we need a satisfactory definition of federalism. Unfortunately,
the current conventional definition will not do. Consider the following
from the standard contemporary work on federalism by Professor K. C.
Wheare. Like Calhoun, Wheare disagrees with The Federalist's com-
pound theory and also sees federal government as a distinctive form
differing from both the confederal and the national forms. He defines
this distinctive federal principle as "the method of dividing powers
5. A recent example of the latter is Gunther, Toward "A More Perfect Union":
Framing and Implementing the Distinctive Nation-Building Elements of the Constitu-
tion, 2 STAN. LAW., Fall 1976, at 5. In this otherwise very thoughtful essay, Professor
Gunther takes note of The Federalist's compound theory, but then treats it only as
belonging to "the terminology of that day." Id.
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so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere,
co-ordinate and independent."6 Nearly all contemporary definitions
concur in the single point of this one, namely, the reduction of
federalism solely to the idea of the division of the governing power3
Indeed, the "division of power" definition of federalism is so familiar
that it is hard to force ourselves to examine it closely. But its shortcom-
ings will become evident if we ask precisely what is federal about such
a division of power. Clearly there is nothing federal at all about the
"general" government; it is just a national government like every other
one, save that its jurisdiction is not complete. The only thing federal,
then, is the retention by the "regional governments" of some portion
of the governing power. But this is manifestly nothing more than to
define arbitrarily as uniquely federal what is merely the combination
of an incomplete national government with the retention in the mem-
ber units of a confederal/federal autonomy in some respects. In short,
the modern theory turns out to be an arbitrarily unacknowledged and
hence obscuring version of The Federalist's compound theory. The
Federalist openly alerts us to the national and federal elements in the
compound, enabling us to see when it is becoming more simply na-
tional or more simply federal, and thereby enabling us to take appro-
priate action. By lumping together under the term federal government
what The Federalist keeps separatdly visible, the modern definition
makes it harder for us to see and evaluate such changes in the com-
pound system.
But more importantly, the modem definition is a badly truncated
version of The Federalist's compound theory. It blinds us to a whole
range of federal phenomena that The Federalist's understanding of
federalism properly comprehends. A moment's reflection reminds us
what is left out. Consider the Senate; every school child knows (or at
least used to be taught) that the Senate is a peculiarly federal part of
American government. The Federalist, as we shall see, can readily ex-
plain what is federal about the Senate. And so can we all, unless we
take seriously the modem definition of federalism, which makes the
6. K. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 11 (3d ed. 1953).
7. An example in a recent American textbook can be found in M. CUMMINGS & D.
VISE, DErMOCRACY UNDER PRssURE (3d ed. 1977): "[T]he United States has a federal
system of government, in which power is constitutionally shared by a national govern-
ment and fifty state governments." Id. at 63 (emphasis added). See also W. BENNETr,
AMERICAN THEoRIES oF FEDERALISM 10 (1964) (The "essence of federalism" is evidenced by
any "political system in which there is a constitutional distribution of powers between
provincial governments and a common central authority."); W. RIKER, FEDERALISM 5
(1964) ("The essential institutions of federalism are, of course, a government of the
federation and a set of governments of the member units . . . .")
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federalness of the Senate quite inexplicable. After all, the Senate has
nothing to do with the reserved powers of the states, which is the sole
federal desideratum according to the modern definition. The Senate
is a part of the general government of the whole society. But it is a
federal part of that government. And that is what the truncated
modem definition cannot reach-the federal elements in the structure
and procedures of the central government itself. By limiting federalism
to the reserved jurisdiction of the states, the modem definition obliges
us, insofar as we take it seriously, to conceive the central government
as purely national. It thus contradicts what our commonsense tells us
about the federal character of the Senate and, as we shall see, it tends
to blind us to other federal elements in the design of our central
government.
The Federalist's compound theory offers a clearer and fuller account
of federalism, albeit not in the handy form of a definition. We must
glean that definition from the various ways The Federalist replies to
the main charge made by the opponents of the proposed Constitution,
namely, that it had departed from the federal form in favor of the
"consolidated" national form. In Federalist 39, where the charge is
most systematically dealt with, Madison examines five ways to "ascer-
tain the real character of the government" relative to the federal-
national question.s By examining them closely, we will be able to
piece together The Federalist's understanding of federalism.
First, the mode by which the Constitution is to be ratified, Madison
argues, is federal and not national, because only the voluntary assent
of each state, taken as a distinct and independent body politic, joins it
to the Union. Second, Madison examines the sources of the legislative
and executive branches of the central government. The House of
Representatives is national because it derives from the whole people
treated as a single body politic; the people will be represented in it,
Madison says, exactly as they would be in any unitary state. Con-
trarily, the Senate is a federal element in the central government be-
cause it derives from, and represents equally, the states treated as
"political and coequal societies." The Presidency has a "very com-
pound source" because the electoral votes allotted to the states "are in
a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal
societies, partly as unequal members of the same society." The pres-
idential aspect of the central government thus "appears to be of a
8. The quotations in the analysis that follows are taken from THE FEDERALIST No. 29,
at 250-57. The concept of federalism is discussed throughout The Federalist; other
papers that are especially relevant are numbers 15-17, 23, 27, 45, and 46.
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mixed character presenting at least as many federal as national fea-
tures." Third, the government's mode of operation, in-exercising its
enumerated powers, is national because it reaches directly to individual
citizens like any other national government (like any government, one
might say). Fourth, as to the extent of its powers, Madison cautiously
says that the government "cannot be deemed a national one," because
it has a limited, enumerated jurisdiction. Madison means that the
new system is national as to the extent of powers entrusted, but is
federal insofar as a substantial portion of the governing powers au-
tonomously remains with the states as distinct political societies. (No-
tice that Madison is here treating as but one aspect of federalism what
the modern definition treats as the whole of it. In his first three con-
siderations, Madison had been inquiring into what was federal in the
formation, structure, and operation of the central government, that is,
into crucial aspects of federalism which the modern definition ex-
cludes from its purview.)
Fifth, and finally, Madison judges the amending process to be
neither wholly federal nor wholly national. His argument on this
brings to the fore the logic and language of his theory of federalism.
[Were the amending process] wholly national, the supreme and
ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of
the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times,
like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish
its established Government. Were it wholly federal on the other
hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be es-
sential to every alteration that would be binding on all. . . . In
requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the
proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from the national,
and advances toward the federal character: In rendering the con-
currence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it
loses again the federal, and partakes of the national character.' 0
This is the way the federal principle was understood in 1787 and,
for that matter, in all earlier political writings. We are now in a posi-
tion to summarize it. Having the nature of a "league or contract,""
federalism is a relation of independent, equal bodies politic that join
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 255 (emphasis in original).
10. Id. at 257 (emphasis in original).
11. Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined "confederacy" as: "A league; a contract by
which several persons or bodies of men engage to support each other; union; engage-
ment; federal compact." The definition of "federal" said: "Relating to a league or con-
tract." The entry for "federate" said: "Leagued; joined in confederacy." 1 S. JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Philadelphia 1818) (1st Amer. ed. from l1th
London ed.).
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together for limited purposes and carry those out, as the Latin root
(foedus, fides) of the word reminds us, only by the obligation of good
faith, rather than by governmental, which is to say coercive, authority.
Insofar as any governmental structure, process, power, or practice
conforms to the primacy of the separate bodies politic, to their equal
status within the federal association, to the limited nature of that
association, and to its operational dependence upon faithful com-
pliance rather than political coercion, the structure, process, power,
or practice is federal; insofar as it departs toward the principle of a
complete, coercive government of a single body politic, it is national.
Indeed, one may even contrast federalism, not only with national
government, but with government as such. This is in fact what
Alexander Hamilton argues in Federalist 15. The Constitution differs
from the Articles of Confederation, he argues, because it incor-
porates "those ingredients which may be considered as forming the
characteristic difference between a league and a government."'
2
Because they thus understood federalism, the leading Framers of the
Constitution were convinced that no "merely federal" system would
suffice for the purposes of union.13 For those purposes, the federal
principle of voluntary association was inadequate; a true government
of the whole was required. "Mr. Govr. Morris explained the distinc-
tion beween a federal and national, supreme, Govt.; the former being
a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter
having a compleat and compulsive operation."'14 Accordingly, in the
Virginia Plan, the leading Framers proposed "a national Government
•. ' *consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary."'u
Happily, as we may now say, they did not wholly succeed in their plan
to institute "one supreme power, and one only";' 6 federal elements
were worked back into their national design. Had the nationalists
wholly succeeded, the Preamble of the Constitution would have had
to read "in order to form a perfect Union," not just a "more perfect"
one. Had the opponents of the Constitution succeeded, the country
would have remained under the radically imperfect Union provided
by the Articles of Confederation. The phrase "a more perfect Union"
is no grammatical solecism, but an accurate description of the com-
promised, compoundly federal and national system that resulted from
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 95.
13. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDRAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 33 (rev. ed.
1937).
14. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
15. Id. at 33 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 34 (remark of Gouverneur Morris).
1280
Vol. 86: 1273, 1977
Commentaries on The Federalist
the Convention and that Madison had the theoretical apparatus to
analyze so precisely.
The Federalist's theory of federalism is not only analytically superior
to our contemporary approach in explaining the American political
system as originally devised, but it also better illuminates the federal-
national balance of the system as it has developed historically. The
Senate is again a good case in point. It has developed in some respects
into a more nationally oriented body than the House, where localist
tendencies are very strong. Yet why should this be so if the Senate,
because of the equal suffrage of the states, is the formally federal
branch of the legislature? Should that not have made the Senate
primarily parochial rather than national in outlook? It could be sug-
gested that its not having become so is but one more example of the
way formal, institutional factors propose, while underlying historical
and behavioral forces informally dispose in unanticipated ways. We
need not have recourse to the mysterious working of such forces in
order to explain why the Senate developed both federal and national
characteristics. Using The Federalist's compound theory, we can see
that the Senate was formally constituted in a more compound manner
than is usually appreciated. Now the leading Framers had always in-
tended some sort of senate to balance and moderate the more im-
mediately democratic House of Representatives; as the democratic
analogue of the traditional upper or aristocratic house, it was in-
tended to be the branch that took the longer and more systematic, as
it were, the more national view. But the Connecticut Compromise
(national House, federal Senate) threatened to balk that intention. The
leading Framers feared that the Senators, as had been so many delegates
to the Confederal Congress, would be too closely bound by state in-
terests and views to function, as desired, on behalf of long-run national
considerations. They succeeded in mitigating the federal character
of the Senate by means of four subtle formal departures from the
practice under the Articles of Confederation. One was the provision
for per capita voting ("each Senator shall have one Vote"). The
Articles had required each state's delegates to cast a single ballot as a
delegation; this forced them to form, as it were, an ambassadorial
judgment on behalf of the state. The constitutional per capita provi-
sion invites and enables Senators to form individual legislative judg-
ments just as do members of the national House of Representatives.
The other departures were three closely linked provisions, all of
which likewise tended to lessen the federal control of the states over
the Senators. One disallowed the states the power they had under the
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Articles to recall their delegates at any time. Another provided for
the six-year senatorial term; and the third permited indefinite and
uninterrupted eligibility for re-election. The Articles had provided
that no person could serve more than three years during any six-year
period, the aim being to keep the delegates on a short leash with
frequent rustication, so to speak, back to the states.
It is easy to summarize the significance of all these departures. The
federal aim of the Articles was to reduce the delegates as much as
possible to the status of agents of their states. The national aim of the
Constitution was to make the Senators, despite the federally equal
suffrage of the states, more nearly into representatives in the Burkean
sense, free to serve long-run national interests as the deliberative pro-
cess suggested. To appreciate the effectiveness of these provisions in
permitting the Senate to develop a national outlook despite its partly
federal basis, think how very much more federal (like Congress under
the Articles) it would have been had the state delegations been obliged
to vote as a unit and had the Senators been obliged to function under
the threat of state recall. By contrast, imagine that the states had not
been made the electoral districts for the Senate and, as was strongly
urged at the Convention, that districts had been based upon the same
national population principle as the House of Representatives. How
very much less federal-how very much less committed to the primacy
of state interests and views-the Senate and all of American politics
would then have become. The peculiarly mixed character of the
Senate as it actually developed becomes more visible and intelligible
when we understand it in the light of The Federalist's theory of a
compoundly federal and national constitutional basis.
Indeed, that theory of federalism can make more visible and in-
telligible the compound complexity of the whole American political
system. It is thus especially valuable to those who treasure the fed-
eral elements in the compound and who fear that those elements
are weakening, because it enables them to see more clearly what
and where the sources of federal vitality are throughout the whole
political system. As we have seen, these are of two fundamental
kinds: everything connected with the division of governing power,
and everything connected with the federal elements in the central
government. The importance of the first source, the balance be-
tween state power and the enumerated powers of the central govern-
ment, is understandable enough under the modern theory of fed-
eralism; indeed, that is all it comprehends. It also is that source or
aspect of federalism most familiar and intelligible to students of
1282
Vol. 86: 1273, 1977
Commentaries on The Federalist
constitutional law. Ever since McCulloch v. Maryland, the question of
the extent of the enumerated powers has been, to use Marshall's
phrase, "perpetually arising."' 17 In any event, it happens to be a ques-
tion that is perpetually gratifying to lawyers and the courts because it
is so amenable to legal disputation and judicial determination. But
The Federalist, as this review has argued, directs our attention to what
may be called the political rather than the legal side of federalism. It
emphasizes that other and neglected source of federalism, namely, the
federal elements in the design of the central government itself and in
its politics. Both sources of federalism, not just the one emphasized in
the modern theory and in constitutional law, sustain the federal
vitality of American government and political life, a vitality achieved
by keeping interest, affection, power, and energy alive and well at the
state level of politics in an otherwise homogenizing and centralizing
age. Neither source should be neglected.
The status of the first of these two has been rendered increasingly
problematic since the time of the New Deal. For decades the limiting
doctrine of delegated and enumerated powers has been eroded, and
the scope of national government has been vastly expanded. True, the
strength of the states in the system has not been weakened to a cor-
responding degree. This is because the states have likewise vastly in-
creased the scope of their activities. Although perhaps not an unmixed
blessing, it means that the state is still that government which most
affects citizens in their daily lives. Heedless of many learned pro-
nouncements on their obsolescence, the states have thus stubbornly
retained more of their federal vigor than might have been expected.
Nonetheless, those who are concerned to preserve the federalism in
the American compound remain concerned to limit the growth of
national government relative to the states, as one indispensable support
for that federalism. To this end, it is especially necessary to restore the
moral and intellectual bona fides of the constitutional doctrine of
enumerated powers as a crucial resource for limiting that growth.
But those concerned to preserve federalism must also devote their
energies to that other support of American federalism to which The
Federalist alerts them, namely, the federal elements in the central
government. One such element now under heavy attack is the Electoral
College. But the federal aspect to the Electoral College controversy has
received relatively little attention: indeed, it is regarded as irrelevant
to it. The argument has been that because the President is the rep-
17. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
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resentative of "all the people," he should be elected by them in a
wholly national way, unimpeded by the interposition of the states
through the Electoral College. Given the prevailing understanding of
federalism, the "general" government is supposed to be purely na-
tional; from this perspective, the participation of the states in pres-
idential selection does indeed seem to be an unjustifiable intrusion,
and the potential "mischiefs" resulting from that intrusion seem in-
supportable. But from the perspective of The Federalist's compound
theory of American government, there is no reason why the President,
admittedly the representative of "all the people," cannot represent
them and, hence, be elected by them in a way corresponding to the
American government's compoundly federal and national character.
The Presidency, especially the modern Presidency, is no doubt the
most nationalizing single element in the American political system,
and quite rightly so. Yet the method by which the President is elected
has also operated for years in a countervailing federalizing fashion,
and just as rightly so. Every Presidential election-the nominating
campaigns as well as the electoral campaign itself-is a dramatic re-
affirmation that the states are the basis of American political life.
Nothing is more vigorously federal than this informal manifestation
of federalism in political practice. But it all depends upon the formal
structure of the Electoral College as originally conceived and as sub-
sequently statutorily modified by the states. The informal federalizing
effect of the Electoral College derives in the first instance from the
"compound ratio" by which the states figure in the original constitu-
tional design. Still more federalizing is the general ticket or unit-rule
system (the state's entire electoral vote goes to the popular vote winner
in the state) which, for nearly a century and a half, almost all the
states have employed. Any removal of these federalizing elements, any
change toward a purely national mode of Presidential election, would
have a corresponding nationalizing effect on the spirit and practice of
American politics. The nominating process-primaries and national
party conventions-now is radically decentralized by force of the Elec-
toral College's use of the states as states; the nominating process
naturally takes its cues from the electing process. If the President
were elected in a single national election, the same "cuing" process
would continue, but in reverse.
However unproblematic such a centralizing effect might have
seemed to partisans of electoral reform some years ago, it seems very
problematic indeed now when circumstances are so changed. The
thrust of much recent social and political criticism has been against
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the homogenizing and centralizing tendencies of mass society and its
tendency to diminish political participation. The Federalist alerts us
to the federal implications of the Electoral College and its potential
for countervailing those tendencies. To nationalize the Presidential
election, especially in this age of electronic media, is to reduce
Presidential politics to a single arena with room for little participa-
tion. By preserving the federal importance of the states in the process,
the Electoral College scatters the Presidential contest into fifty-one
arenas (the states and the District of Columbia), with correspondingly
enlarged opportunity for a vastly greater number of political partici-
pants.
The modem theory of federalism tends to blind us to such pe-
ripheral possibilities of federalism in the Presidential election process
and throughout our political system. The Federalist's theory is superior
in clarity and comprehensiveness. The reason this can be so, despite
nearly two centuries of eventful history since The Federalist was
written, is that its political understanding was not limited to the
historical period within which it was produced. Rather, it speaks to
perennial political issues and, especially, to those peculiar to the genius
of American politics. Publius (the pen name Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay used in writing the essays) remains our most instructive political
thinker. Making accessible to contemporary use his subtle under-
standing of federalism and of the compoundly federal and national
American republic has been the intention of this review.
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